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The strong political support for biogas production in Germany over the past decade has greatly affected
agricultural production, farms and land markets. This paper analyzes the effects of Germany's biogas
policies on agricultural development by using the agent-based simulation model AgriPoliS. Particular
focus is placed on the effects of the previous German Renewable Energy Act (REA, German “EEG”) of
2012, as well as the latest amendments, which were added in 2014. Our results show that under the
previous REA and its predecessors, biogas production provided an attractive investment opportunity,
especially for large farms, which led to a boost in biogas production. However, this policy also caused
distortions within the agricultural sector, including increasing land rental prices. These effects particu-
larly threatened farms that were not able to invest in biogas, as well as smaller biogas farms. On average,
biogas farms could not increase their proﬁtability. The main reason for this effect can be seen in the fact
that a signiﬁcant share of the value added is transferred via increased rental prices to land owners. The
amendment of the REA in 2014, which reduced support levels substantially, partly attenuates some of
these effects, though the previous policy will cast a long shadow.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction and background
Biogas production can be considered one of the most inﬂuential
innovations in German agriculture in recent decades. Farms'
adoption of biogas production jumped after the Renewable Energy
Sources Act (REA)1 was introduced in 2004. Guaranteed feed-in
tariffs (which mean a guaranteed price for the delivered elec-
tricity) for a period of 20 years and priority access to the electricity
grid provided strong incentives for farmers to invest in biogas
plants (AEE, 2012). Prior to 2004, biogas played only a minor role in
German agriculture, but after the REA was established, both the
number of biogas plants and the average plant capacity increased.
Particularly between 2006 and 2011, the total number of plants
doubled and the total capacity increased by more than 150%. In
2013, more than 7850 biogas plants with a total capacity of
3543 MW produced renewable energy in Germany (Fachverband
Biogas, 2014); this has implications on the structure of German
agriculture. About 85% of these plants are operated by farmers, andbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG).
Ltd. This is an open access article umost feedstuff used in biogas plants is based on agricultural pro-
duce (Fachverband Biogas, 2015).
In general, agricultural structural change involves multiple and
interlinked drivers that affect farm sizes, production patterns and
farm capacities, as well as the economic and social situation of
farms (cf. Goddard et al., 1993; Balmann et al., 2006). The renewable
energy policies on the national level in Germany, i.e. the guaranteed
feed-in tariffs for biogas production, also have strong implications
for farms and farm structures. Several empirical studies found that
the higher the biogas production in a region, the stronger was the
increase in land purchase and rental prices (Braun et al., 2007;
Kilian et al., 2008; Habermann and Breustedt, 2011; Hüttel et al.,
2012). This is because biogas producers need substrates to feed
their biogas plants; key feed stuffs are silage from maize, other
cereals and grasses. To produce the necessary amount of biomass,
an appropriate amount of land is required either by the farms or by
farms in the region that provide the feedstuff. Although biogas
plants are usually planned and built according to the available
feedstock, the lifetime of the plants exceeds the duration of rental
contracts. Therefore, farmswith biogas plants have to ensure access
to land rental contracts via high bids. In addition to the effects on
the land market, biogas production also affects the composition of
regional production. Fodder production for livestock and foodnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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energy crops such as maize and ley (cf. Agrarheute, 2013; KLU,
2013). On the other hand, livestock production on biogas farms
partly beneﬁts from biogas investments because since 2009 the use
of manure as a complementary co-substrate has been highly sub-
sidized (REA, 2008).
Concerns regarding their future development perspectives exist
on the side of farms that are either not willing or not able to invest
in biogas production. These farms fear for their (future) com-
petiveness, particularly on the land market (cf. Deutschlandfunk,
2013; Spiegel, 2010). On the other hand, biogas farmers are con-
cerned about the stability of political decisions (cf. Hemmerling,
2013; taz 2015). Furthermore, electricity prices for private house-
holds and smaller ﬁrms increased signiﬁcantly (cf. Editorial, this
issue). The Renewable Energy Act was amended several times since
2000 (see Editorial, same issue). The latest change introduced in
2014, resulted in a substantial reduction of the guaranteed feed-in
tariffs.
While the impacts of biogas production on land markets and
land prices have been analyzed in the past, other aspects of struc-
tural change such as impacts on farm performance and cultivation
patterns have hardly been analyzed. The present paper seeks to ﬁll
this gap by studying the long-term impacts of renewable energy
policy and subsequently biogas production on two German regions,
namely the Altmark in Eastern Germany and the Ostallg€au (East
Allg€au) in Southern Germany, which have very different farm
structures. Nevertheless, both regions have an agricultural sector
with a high proportion of specialized dairy farms and grassland,
and therefore have sources of biomass from several sectors,
including manure.
As we focus on the farm level as well as on the regional level, we
concentrate on the following aspects: the investment behavior of
farms regarding biogas production; the effects of biogas production
on structural change; regional cultivation patterns; the land mar-
ket; and on the overall performance of farms. Contrary to previous
studies focusing on empirical land market data, we use an agent-
based simulation model, namely AgriPoliS. This spatially explicit
and dynamic agent-based model enables ex post and ex ante an-
alyses of agricultural structural change, particularly regarding the
impact of alternative policies and assumptions on agriculture by
comparing actual policies with counterfactual assumptions. Policy
impacts that can be analyzed include shares of different crops,
proﬁts of biogas and non-biogas farms, rental prices for arable and
grazing land, as well as farm size developments. As far as possible,
simulation results are validated by comparing themwith empirical
observations. As the majority of biogas plants are operated by
farmers (Fachverband Biogas, 2015), biogas production of non-
agricultural investors is not considered in the model simulations,
though these investments also affect agricultural production and
land markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the
agent-based model AgriPoliS, together with the case study regions
Altmark and East Allg€au. In section 3, simulation results for a time
period of 12 years are analyzed, while section 4 provides discussion
and conclusions.2. Methodological approach and case study region
To analyze the impact of biogas production, we use the agent-
based model AgriPoliS (Agricultural Policy Simulator, e.g. Happe
et al., 2006). In this chapter we describe the model's features and
the study regions.2.1. The agent-based model AgriPoliS
AgriPoliS is an agent-based spatial model that enables one to
simulate the development of regional agricultural structures over
time in response to alternative scenarios such as speciﬁc policies
(see Happe, 2004; Happe et al., 2008; Sahrbacher et al., 2012a;
Balmann, 1997). A detailed documentation of the current version
can be found in Kellermann et al. (2008). A protocol following the
ODD standard (Overview, Design concepts and Details) is available
in Sahrbacher et al. (2012b).
In AgriPoliS, a number of individual agents represent farms that
interact in a synthetic landscape that maps agriculturally related
regional and structural characteristics. AgriPolis is adapted to
selected regions by specifying farm types that are typical for that
region and which are weighted to match regional characteristics.
Apart from the farms' initial factor endowment and size, the
different farm types are differentiated in a stratiﬁcation process
during the initialization of a model run. According to the weight of
the farm types, a proportional number of farm agents are randomly
distributed in the spatial grid of land plots and initialized with
individual management skills (i.e. different variable production
costs) and ages of the farmer and farm assets.
The farms are assumed to maximize proﬁts or household in-
come by use of a mixed-integer programming model that is linked
to the selected farm agents' data on factor endowments (facilities,
labor, capital, land, management quality, etc.), as well as the various
production and investment alternatives from which the farms can
choose to maximize their proﬁt. The provided investment and
production activities can be considered as typical for the region and
are calibrated such that in the beginning of each simulation, the
derived farm agents choose the same or similar production activ-
ities as the real farms they represent.
Besides deciding on products and investments, farms can also
extend their capacities by renting additional agricultural land and
employing workers. Furthermore, capital can be borrowed on a
short- and long-term basis. In contrast, capacities can be reduced,
e.g., land rental contracts can expire, quotas can be rented out, hired
labor can be dismissed and family workers can be employed
outside of the farm. Furthermore, liquid assets may be invested
outside the farm. In case of renting land, farms compete for avail-
able land (i.e. land that is currently not rented) via a repeated
auction. Within the auction, every farmer ﬁrst selects the available
plot that is most valuable to the farm and then calculates a bid for
this plot. Every farm's bid equals a speciﬁc proportion (e.g. 80%) of
the marginal gross margin of this additional plot. The bid considers
transportation costs that are assumed to be proportional to the
distance between plot and farm. The farm with the highest bid
receives the plot and is able to use it for a speciﬁc contract length
(cf. Kellermann et al., 2008, p. 28 ff.). Afterwards, all farms can again
submit bids that are compared again. This procedure continues as
long as land is available. Finally, farms can also leave the sector if
they are illiquid or expect a lack of coverage of opportunity costs.
2.2. Case study regions
The ﬁrst case study region is the Altmark, which is located in the
north of the German Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt, approx.
50e150 km west of Berlin, and comprises the two districts Stendal
and Altmarkkreis Salzwedel. Being characterized by large arable
farms, as well as large mixed farms with livestock, the Altmark
captures important features of East German agriculture (see
Table 1). The relative importance of livestock production is
emphasized by the fact that as of 2007, some 40% of the dairy cows
and 53% of the specialized dairy farms in Saxony-Anhalt were
located in the Altmark, though the region covers only 23% of the
Table 1
Characteristic indicators of the study regions.
Altmark East Allg€au
Number of farms 957 1057
Average farm size in ha UAA/farma 278 26
Number of dairy cows/dairy farm 178 30
Share of grassland in % 27 >90
a UAA: utilizable agricultural area.
Source: StaLa (2008, 2014), Bayrisches Landesamt für Statistik und
Datenverarbeitung (2011).
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2014). Farms are predominantly organized as legal entities, full-
and part-time family farms, as well as partnerships. Although legal
entities that are usually either limited liabilities or production co-
operatives only account for some 10% of the farms, they use almost
45% of the UAA.
The other study region is located in the district of Ostallg€au (East
Allg€au) in the south of Bavaria. The landscape structure of mainly
pre-Alpine terrain is bounded on the south by the Allg€au Alps. This
region is also relatively homogeneous in terms of geographic and
climatic conditions. With a high share of grassland (almost no
arable land), this region is particularly suitable for dairy production.
The East Allg€au is predominated by small and more homogeneous
family farms with less than 30 ha. Overall in 2007, the 27,117 ha
UAA in the selected municipalities were maintained by 1057 farms;
844 of them hold a total of 25,499 dairy cows (Bayrisches
Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung, 2011). Beef cattle
and suckler cows are less common, and there is hardly any other
livestock in the study area.
Both study regions are suitable for biogas production. Since
2009, the Altmark has been assigned as one of 25 so-called bio-
energy regions (BMELV, 2012) in Germany because it offers a huge
potential of biomass from several sectors. In the long run, one aim
of the bioenergy regions initiative is to generate regional value
added by extending bioenergy production to support the sustain-
able development of rural areas (Regionale Planungsgemeinschaft
Altmark, 2012). With a high proportion of specialized dairy farms
and grass land, agriculture provides biomass for energy production,
e.g. biogas. Many farms have invested in biogas production in
recent years: in 2012, a total of 107 biogas plants produced
364 GWh electrical energy (Landtag von Sachsen-Anhalt, 2014).
As a region focused on grassland and livestock, East Allg€au is
also suitable for biogas production. The distribution of biogas plants
in Bavaria (LFL, 2006) shows a signiﬁcant investment concentration
in the cattle-growing regions of Swabia and Allg€au, Bavaria Central
Franconia and the Southeast. Currently, 74 biogas plants are oper-
ating in East Allg€au (LFL, 2014).2.3. Modelling the regions in AgriPoliS2
To adapt AgriPoliS to the regional agricultural structure of the
Altmark and East Allg€au, available statistics on regional agricultural
characteristics (e.g. number of farms, livestock, farm size classes
etc.) and FADN data of regional farms are used (cf. Balmann et al.,
2010). Because of data availability and calibration purposes, the
model was initialized for 2006 and simulations start in 2006. The
adaptation procedure resulted in 33 typical farms for the Altmark,
which are stratiﬁed according to their weights to 968 model farms.
For the East Allg€au, 16 typical farms represent 962 model farms.2 This section is based on Ostermeyer (2015) which contains a more detailed
description of the implementation of the two model regions.Themodel farms are able to produce cash crops and fodder from
arable land (only in the Altmark), and feedstuff from grass and
livestock. The assumptions for the different production processes
are derived from publicly available data bases for crops (LLFG,
2009), as well as feed and livestock (MLUV, 2008; LFL, 2006 and
2014). For the initialization, i.e. the starting year of 2006, no model
farm is assumed to be invested in biogas production. The reason is
that statistical data about existing biogas plants for both regions in
2006 were not available. With regard to biogas production, starting
in 2006, the model farms can invest in biogas plants of different
sizes. For biogas production they can choose between different
substrate mixtures. Table 2 shows the assumptions on the biogas
plants regarding their revenues from feed-in tariffs, the investment
and calculated substrate costs, as well as the working time required
to operate the plant. The guaranteed feed-in remuneration, con-
sisting of a basic payment and bonuses, are derived from the REA
2009 and 2012 (BMJ, 2008, 2010 and 2011). Overall, three plant
sizes for each region (150, 450, 800 kW for Altmark and 70, 125,
200 kW for East Allg€au), and threemixtures with different shares of
maize and grass silage, liquid cattle manure, and rye grain are
offered. The plant sizes between which the farms can choose are
adapted to the regional characteristics and are derived from data
provided from KTBL (2010) and Grundmann et al. (2006). The in-
vestment costs per kW are assumed to decrease with increasing
plant size, but are also regionally adjusted and calibrated in relation
to other costs in the region so that the simulation results are
assessed as realistic by stakeholders (Ostermeyer, 2015). Model
farms can neither choose intermediate plant sizes, e.g. between 150
and 450 kW, nor cooperate and share facilities. In the East Allg€au
region, farms have no access to arable land. The farms are, however,
allowed to buy maize silage from outside the region. We assume
ﬁxed exogenous prices for maize silage, which probably un-
derestimates that these substrate costs also rise because of sub-
stantial biogas investments. In the Altmark region, model farms do
not have the opportunity to buy substrates from other farms. Local
experts and farmers reported during stakeholder workshops in the
Altmark that in general only non-agricultural investors buy their
substrates from other farmers The biogas-producing farmers in the
Altmark are assumed to have either sufﬁcient arable land or can
rent additional land to produce the required substrates by them-
selves (see Ostermeyer, 2015). As the activities of non-agricultural
biogas producers are not considered, our analysis underestimates
the indirect land market effects of biogas support.
According to the REA 2012 and its previous forms, the basic
guaranteed feed-in tariff for new bioenergy plants declines over
time. For simpliﬁcation, we did not consider this dynamic degres-
sion of feed-in tariffs. This is to some extent balanced by ignoring
the likely decrease in investment and production costs over time
because of technological progress (cf. Prognos, 2010). Therefore, we
assume constant remunerations (Table 2) during the 2013 to 2025
period according to the REA. Furthermore, we have not imple-
mented the requirement that biogas operations require aminimum
use of heat because there is no data available regarding the extent
to which these could be used in the respective regions.
The REA has been reformed several times. These reforms are
considered in a simpliﬁed way. For 2006 to 2011, the regulations of
the REA 2009 (BMJ, 2010) are assumed to be valid. Starting in 2012,
assumptions shown in Tables 1 and 2 are considered. The main
difference between the REA 2012 and the REA 2009 affects the
allowed shares of different substrate types. In 2012 a maximum
limit of 60% of maize silage, corncob mix and grain kernel was
introduced in the REA. This limitation is also used in the model
(Table 3). Accordingly, from 2012 on, farms can choose between
three mixtures to produce biogas. With Mix 3 it is possible to
operate a biogas plant without cattle manure. More common in
Table 2
Assumptions on biogas production from 2013 to 2025.
Altmark East Allg€au
150 kW 450 kW 800 kW 70 kW 125 kW 200 kW
Feed-in tariff in 1000 Euro/year (dep. on mix) 208e213 544e579 935e992 93e118 168e173 295e303
Feed-in tariff in 1000 Euro/year (REA 2014) 129a 401a 720a 55e111a 99a 161a
Investment costs in 1000 Euro 850 1825 2650 420 625 800
Investment costs in Euro/kW 5667 4056 3313 6000 5000 4000
Calculated substrate costs in 1000 Euro/year (w/o costs for manure) 66e99 198e277 351e476 35e50 59e85 93e131
Working hours (dep. on mix) 894e1064 1344e1581 1839e2227 623e642 709e738 819e862
a From 2014 in the REA 2014 scenario.
Source: Own assumptions according to BMJ (2011), KTBL (2010).
Table 3
Assumptions on substrate mixtures from 2013 to 2025.
Altmark East Allg€au
Mix 1 Mix 2 Mix 3 Mix 1 Mix 2 Mix 3
Cattle manure 60% 30% e 80% 50% 45%
Maize silage 20% 60% 20% 10% 50% 20%
Grass silage 20% 10% 20% 10% e 35%
Whole-crop-silage e e 40% e e e
Rye grain e e 20% e e e
Source: Ostermeyer (2015).
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For validation of bothmodel regions, as well as for the simulation of
biogas production we used a participatory approach that included
stakeholders (for more details see Ostermeyer, 2015, p 96 ff).
In our study, we compare two biogas scenarios with a reference
scenario (REF). In the REF scenario, farms cannot invest in biogas
plants at any time. This counterfactual scenario enables us to
analyze how the model regions would have developed without the
inﬂuence of the REA and biogas production; it thus serves as a
benchmark to analyze the effects of biogas production. Biogas
production is implemented in two scenarios, where model farmers
can choose biogas production as an activity. In the REA 2014 sce-
nario, the feed-in tariffs and conditions follow the REA 2012 from
2006 until 2013 for new investments. From 2014 onwards, theTable 4
Comparison of scenarios and basis paymentsa) in ct/kWh.
Possibility to invest 
in biogas plants
plant size
20
13
-2
01
4
Basis Payment in 
ct/kWh
75 kW
150 kW
500 kW
5 MW
20 MW
20
14
 -
20
25
Basis Payment in 
ct/kWh
75 kW
150 kW
500 kW
5 MW
20 MW
* Minimum share of manure in the substrate mixture 
a) Bonus payments e.g. for Feedstock class I and II, an
Source: Juris (2014).conditions of REA 2014 apply according to the latest amendment of
the renewable energy act in 2014 (cf. Table 4). Other regulations
such as the capping of the guaranteed payments for plants larger
than 100 kW were not considered. The REA 2012 scenario contains
a hypothetical continuation of the REA 2012 after 2014. Apart from
these differences regarding biogas production, farms have the same
conditions in all three scenarios.3. Results
The analysis of biogas policy impacts focuses on the following
aspects: Investments in biogas plants, structural change, changes in
cultivation patterns, effects on land markets, and farm perfor-
mance. Tominimize random effects resulting from the initialization
of AgriPoliS, each scenario is simulated 100 times. Simulations start
for calendar year 2006, and our analyses consider the period 2013
as the last year before the reform of 2025.
For the analysis, we differentiate between “biogas farms” and
“non-biogas farms”. Those farms that invest in biogas plants in the
REA 2012 scenario are labeled “biogas farms” irrespective of their
behavior in the other scenarios. Farms that do not invest in biogas
plants in the REA 2012 scenario are labeled as “non-biogas farms”.
These labels are applied for the same farms in the REF and REA 2014
scenario, irrespective of whether the farms invest in a biogas plant
in these scenarios. In doing so we are able to analyze how biogas
producers in the scenario REA 2012 would have developed withoutREF REA 2012 REA 2014
no yes Yes
25.00* 25.00*
14.30 14.30
12.30 12.30
11.00 11.00
6.00 6.00
25.00* 23.73*
14.30 13.66
12.30 11.78
11.00 10.55
6.00 5.85
is 80% (manure bonus)
d manure were not considered in the Simulation
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setting.3.1. Investment in biogas
Only a fraction of the farms is able and willing to invest in a
biogas plant. A certain farm size and sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources
are prerequisites for investments. Table 5 shows that biogas farms
are on average substantially larger than non-biogas farms. In terms
of European size units (ESU), biogas farms are nearly 1.8 times as
large as other farms in the Altmark region. In the East Allg€au region
they are even 2.5 times larger. In terms of farm size in ha, they are
around 4 times (6 times in East Allg€au) larger, have a higher share of
rented land, keep many more dairy cows, and have a higher equity
capital.
In the “REA 2012” scenario, in 2013, 89 of the 709 model farms
(i.e. 12.6%) in the Altmark region own a total of 184 biogas plants,
with a total capacity of around 36 MW. Accordingly, biogas-
producing farms have, on average, an installed capacity of around
405 kW. In the East Allg€au region there are far fewer biogas farms.
Only 5 of the 917 model farms (0.5%) invest until 2013 in biogas
plants, with a total capacity of 744 kW. The lower level of biogas
production in the East Allg€au region is mainly due to the fact that
the farms have only grassland and no arable land, and thus can
neither cultivate maize as feed for their cattle, nor use it as a sub-
strate for their biogas plants; they have to purchase maize silage.
Compared to reality, model farms invest in more but smaller
biogas plants. This is because model farms can neither choose in-
termediate sizes, e.g., between 150 and 450 kW, nor cooperate and
share facilities. Furthermore, model farms do not have the oppor-
tunity to buy substrates from other farms (except for maize silage in
the East Allg€au region). Therefore, most model farms are too small
to invest in biogas plants. In 2013, the smallest farm that invests in a
biogas plant in the Altmark manages 315 ha and 240 dairy cows,
and in the East Allg€au 103 ha and 135 dairy cows. As a consequence,
the simulation results underestimate the real investments sys-
tematically. For example in 2012, the installed capacity of the Alt-
mark region was around 48 MW (Landtag von Sachsen-Anhalt,
2014), while in the model, in 2013 the plants have a total
installed capacity of 36 MW.
For the period since the latest amendment of the renewable
energy act in 2014, simulation results support expectations that
biogas production would continue to increase if there would be no
policy reform. A continuation of bioenergy support according to the
REA 2012 would have offered substantial potentials for biogas
farms to invest in more and even larger plants: in the Altmark, the
number of some 90 biogas-producing farms remains stable, while
the installed capacity increases. This indicates rising plant sizes.
From 2013 with an average installed capacity of 405 kW, biogas
farms increase their capacities to 892 kW per farm in 2025. In the
East Allg€au region, the average installed capacity increases fromTable 5
Characteristics of biogas and non-biogas farms in the REA 2012 scenario 2013 (model re
Characteristics Altmark
Biogas farms Non-bi
Number of farms 89 620
Average farm size in ha 1182 282
Average farm size in ESUa 655 76
Share of rented land (%) 93 82
Number of dairy cows 1048 48
Equity capital in EUR 1,268,139 272,679
Equity capital in EUR/ha 1073 967
a ESU means European size units; one ESU equals 1200 Euro standard gross margins (161 kW to 174 kW per farm, and the number of biogas-producing
farms increases by almost a factor of 6 between 2013 and 2025
(Fig. 1). This means that farms need to reach a critical size ﬁrst
before they are able to invest in biogas.
According to our simulations, the REA 2014 stops the rapid
expansion of biogas production in both study regions (cf. Fig. 1). In
the Altmark, the number of biogas plants even declines slightly as
some biogas farms exit in the REA 2014 scenario and no new in-
vestments in biogas plants are realized after 2013. The installed
capacity for the whole region remains constant for several years
due to the operational lifetime of the existing biogas plants. In the
East Allg€au, the capacity increases after the reform slightly further
due to a few additional investments. The reason is that in the East
Allg€au there are still some investments in small plants that beneﬁt
from a speciﬁc manure bonus (cf. Table 4). Until 2025, the installed
capacity only reaches 1.4 MW in the East Allg€au and even declines
to 26.9 MW in the Altmark.3.2. Structural change
Tables 5 and 6 show that in the Altmark, especially farms with
more than 1000 ha invest in biogas production. Also in the East
Allg€au, only larger farms have resources to invest in biogas plants.
Once invested, biogas farms have the potential to grow faster than
other farms because some of them generate additional proﬁts with
biogas production and offer higher rental prices on the landmarket.
Themodel results (Table 6) show that in the Altmark, farmswith
biogas production would grow in the REA 2012 scenario between
2013 and 2025 by some 38%, to 1636 ha, on average, while their
number would increase by some 21% during the period 2013 taz,
2015. In contrast, non-biogas farms decline faster in total number
as well as in average size compared to the REF scenario.
In the East Allg€au region, the biogas farms are also larger with an
average farm size of about 170 ha in the REA scenarios, compared to
non-biogas farms with 28 ha on average. Until 2025, the number of
biogas farms would increase by 540%, while the average acreage of
these biogas farms increases by only 14% to an average farm size of
194 ha in the REA 2012 scenario. Despite this growth in numbers
and size, the overall share of biogas farms is much lower than in the
Altmark. Accordingly, competition between the non-biogas farms is
not as heavy as in the Altmark. In the REA 2012 scenario, 40% of the
farms in the East Allg€au quit farming until 2025. In the REF scenario,
the number of exits is slightly lower. Thus, in both regions, struc-
tural change is fostered by the biogas subsidies.
In both regions, the REA 2014 amendments affect structural
change in terms of farm sizes and farm exits. While some farms that
invested in biogas production before the introduction of the REA
2014 would grow less fast in the future, others may even grow
faster (cf. Fig. 2). These farms beneﬁt from the fact that after 2013,
hardly any farm invests in biogas production, while they still
receive the guaranteed high feed-in tariffs. In the East Allg€ausults).
East Allg€au
ogas farms Biogas farms Non-biogas farms
5 925
170 28
355 31
76 29
488 92
1,097,237 361,940
6454 12,926
SGM).
Fig. 1. Number of biogas-producing farms and their installed and used capacity in megawatts in the REA 2012 and REA 2014 scenarios, 2013e2025 (model results).
Table 6
Number of farms and farm sizes in the model regions, REF, REA 2012 and REA 2014 scenario (model results).
Altmark East Allg€au
Non-bio. farms Biogas farms Non-bio. farms Biogas farms
Farms Farm sizea Farms Farm sizea Farms Farm sizea Farms Farm sizea
2013 REF 627 273 87 1252 913 28 5 99
REA 2012 620 282 89 1182 912 28 5 170
REA 2014 620 282 89 1182 912 28 5 170
2025 REF 452 274 101 1545 543 43 32 84
REA 2012 424 245 108 1636 519 38 32 194
REA 2014 428 249 107 1624 533 41 32 140
Note: Biogas farms are those farms that invest in biogas plants in the REA 2012 scenario (they do not produce biogas in the REF scenario); Non-Bio. Farms are those farms that
do not invest in biogas plants in the REA 2012 scenario.
a Farm size in hectare UAA.
Fig. 2. Farm size of biogas and non-biogas farms in 2025, in the REA 2012 and REA 2014 scenarios (model results). Note: Farm size in hectares of single farms in 2025. Farms that are
on the 45 degree line are equally sized in both scenarios. Farms underneath the 45 line are larger in the REA 2012 scenario, while farms above the 45 line farm more hectares in
the REA 2014 scenario. Biogas farms are farms that produce biogas in the REA 2012 scenario.
F. Appel et al. / Utilities Policy 41 (2016) 172e182 177region, a few larger biogas farms that would grow substantially in
the REA 2012 scenario would not do so in the REA 2014. Vice versa,a few non-biogas farms may beneﬁt in the REA 2014 because of
higher relative competitiveness.
F. Appel et al. / Utilities Policy 41 (2016) 172e1821783.3. Cultivation
Due to biogas production, the farms' overall production struc-
ture changes. The amount of fallow land decreases and the culti-
vation of maize and other energy crops increases (cf. Fig. 3).
Furthermore, the use of grassland is intensiﬁed as the usage
changes from meadows to grass silage. Due to the lack of arable
land in the East Allg€au region, there is only a minor intensiﬁcation
in the use of grassland, while the purchase of maize silage increases
substantially. In 2013 this rate is doubled compared to the REF
scenario. In total, the amount of purchased maize silage is rather
small; its production requires arable land in an amount of only 0.4%
of total UAA in the East Allg€au. Therefore, a signiﬁcant impact of this
demand for maize silage should not to be expected on the regional
market and thus also not on the price.
Livestock production in the Altmark is positively affected in the
REA 2012 scenario. Due to synergy effects of liquid manure for
bioenergy production, more cows and cattle are kept in the biogas
scenario. This means that the REA policy indirectly supports live-
stock production. Accordingly, the demand for grass and maize as
feed for cattle increases in parallel. In East Allg€au there is no sig-
niﬁcant effect on regional production, neither in crop nor livestock
production, until 2013. This is mainly due to the low level of biogas
production in that region (only 0.5% of the farms in 2013).
The cultivation patterns are also affected by the REA reform in
2014 (Fig. 4). However, there is no straight adjustment towards the
results of the REF situation. In the Altmark, the biogas investments
before 2014 have a long-lasting effect because the assumed oper-
ational lifetime of biogas plants is 20 years and feed-in tariffs are
ﬁxed. Nevertheless, there are some adjustments. Fig. 4 shows that
in the REA 2014 scenario, farms produce more cash crops while the
area for maize, grass silage and other energy crops decreases. More
land becomes fallow, and the stock of cattle declines. This is
different for the East Allg€au because investments in biogas plants
continue even under the REA 2014 conditions. The production
structure in the REA 2014 very strongly resembles the REF situation.
The only observable difference in the land use is a slight drop in
meadows in favor of grass silage production. Accordingly, the 2014
amendments of the REA cause a partial re-adjustment towards the
situation without the previous strong support of the REA 2012,
though there remains a long-term effect.3.4. Land market
AgriPoliS allows one to keep track of the rents paid by single
farms or speciﬁc groups of farms. Table 7 shows that in general,
biogas support causes higher and increasing rental prices. There are
only a few exceptions for 2013 that may be seen as outliers.Fig. 3. Shares of different crop types; and number of cows and heifers inMoreover, Table 7 shows that biogas farms pay substantially higher
land rental prices than non-biogas farms. Obviously, biogas farms
are also more competitive if they cannot invest in biogas. The
reasons for this can be seen in economies of size, as well as in a
superior management coefﬁcient, i.e. producing at lower variable
costs than the average. Vice versa, the relatively low level of rents
paid by non-biogas farms is mainly because these farms are less
competitive in the land auction and rarely get new rental contracts.
In the East Allg€au region, rental prices are substantially higher
than in the Altmark. Several reasons are responsible: Farms in the
East Allg€au often have overcapacities of family labor and a high
equity capital compared to their farm size. Thus, the competition
for land is very intensive in the East Allg€au, as land is the most
scarce production factor. Moreover, the extremely high prices for
newly rented land in 2013 were caused by the fact that in the
beginning, only few farms invest in biogas. This can be seen as a
speciﬁc outlier effect: These few farms are exceptionally proﬁtable
compared to the average farm and therefore have a very high
marginal gross margin for additional land. The average rental price
of biogas farms decrease as more and more other farms also invest
in biogas production, because then also more farms with lower
proﬁtability belongs to the group of biogas farmers In the Altmark,
competition for land is much lower. Compared to the proﬁtability
level, the relatively large farms in Eastern Germany pay relatively
low rental prices (Balmann, 2015). Eventually, they beneﬁt from a
certain market power.
The rental price effects of biogas production decline after the
introduction of the REA 2014 (Table 7). Due to the reduced guar-
anteed feed-in tariffs, biogas farms no longer invest and rent
additional land for biogas production. Nevertheless, in both regions
the rental price for biogas farms remains substantially higher than
in the reference scenario, and may even continue to increase,
particularly in the Altmark. The main reason is the fact that in the
Altmark, rental prices are still low compared to the proﬁtability of
farming, irrespective of biogas support. In the East Allg€au region,
the rental prices in the REA 2014 scenario start to decrease after the
reform.3.5. Farm performance
Rental prices for land affect the farms' proﬁts. The higher the
share of the value-added that is transferred to the land owners as a
result of increased rental prices, the less remains as farm income.
Fig. 5 shows for the Altmark that some biogas-producing farms
have higher proﬁts in the scenario REA 2012 compared to the REF
scenario. The variance of proﬁts is, however, also larger under
conditions of the REA 2012. The average proﬁt of biogas farms is
even slightly lower in the REA 2012 scenario. Comparing 2025 andthe Altmark in the REF and REA 2012 scenario, 2013 (model results).
Fig. 4. Shares of different crop types in the model regions Altmark and East Allg€au in the REA 2012 and REA 2014 scenario, 2025 (model results).
Table 7
Average rental prices for new rented land in 2013 and 2025in Euro per hectare of biogas and non-biogas farms in the model regions, REF, REA 2012 and REA 2014 scenario
(model results).
Altmark East Allg€au
Non-bio. Farms (87%)a Biogas farms (13%)a Non-bio. farms (99%)a Biogas farms (1%)a
Arable land Grassland Arable land Grassland Grassland Grassland
2013 REF 112.06 26.99 206.21 109.35 130.57 351.81
REA 2012 117.03 24.62 191.95 112.87 129.09 590.16
REA 2014 117.03 24.62 191.95 112.87 129.09 590.16
2025 REF 176.18 33.78 299.59 120.59 108.71 187.11
REA 2012 177.77 43.94 332.87 158.33 154.64 237.67
REA 2014 181.91 42.19 316.76 150.08 127.92 220.78
Note: Biogas farms are farms that invest in biogas plants in the REA 2012 scenario (they do not produce biogas in the REF scenario); Non-biogas farms are farms that do not
invest in biogas plants in the REA 2012 scenario.
a Share of farms in 2013.
Fig. 5. Distribution of proﬁts per biogas and non-biogas farms in 1000 Euro in 2013 and 2025 in the Altmark, REF and REA 2012 scenario (model results). Note: Biogas farms are
those farms that invest in biogas plants in the REA 2012 scenario (they do not produce biogas in the REF scenario). Non-biogas farms are those farms that do not invest in biogas
plants in the REA 2012 scenario.
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scenarios, but particularly under conditions of the REA 2012. While
some biogas farms can increase their proﬁts substantially until
2025, other biogas farms even achieve high losses. After investing
in a biogas plant, biogas farms are highly dependent on land to
produce substrates for their biogas plant. Even if they are not
proﬁtable, they need to rent land if rental contracts expire. Then
these farms are competing with proﬁtable biogas farms that may
even bid high rental prices for further growth. Because of the
increasing competition for land, several biogas farms lose their
initial advantage from biogas production. The beneﬁciaries are landowners who receive higher prices for their land. Only those farms
with a real competitive advantage in biogas production beneﬁt in
the longer run; others even lose. The beneﬁting farms are larger
and have a better management coefﬁcient. In the long run, these
effects accumulate. While some biogas farms beneﬁt even more,
others lose even more. On average, the non-biogas farms do not
lose a lot. However, some non-biogas producers are not able to
grow under the conditions of the REA 2012, while they would
prosper in the REF scenario. For the East Allg€au region, these effects
play a minor role, as there are only a few farms investing in biogas
and these are rather large and have higher managerial skills.
F. Appel et al. / Utilities Policy 41 (2016) 172e182180Furthermore, for plant sizes less than 75 kW, these farms have the
opportunity to receive an extra manure bonus. Therefore, biogas
production is slightly more proﬁtable in the East Allg€au, at least for
those farms that have the required size to run a biogas plant.
The amendments of the REA 2014 cause several biogas farms
that are very successful under conditions of the REA 2012 to lose
(Fig. 6). On the other hand, a few biogas farms, and particularly a
number of non-biogas farms in the East Allg€au beneﬁt from the
reduced competition on the land market. These farms beneﬁt from
higher proﬁt per ha (Fig. 6).4. Discussion and conclusions
Our analyses show that only farms with a sufﬁcient farm size
and sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources are able to invest in biogas plants
and thus beneﬁt from the related subsidies. The reason is that a
minimum size is needed to be able to feed a large biogas plant. If
there is speciﬁc and sufﬁciently high support for smaller biogas
plants like in the REA, such smaller plants can be attractive for
farms that have less land. In any case, biogas production requires
substantial amounts of substrate. According to Brendel (2011),
some 200 ha of arable land are needed to operate a plant with a
capacity of 500 kW e depending on the substrate sources and
annual operating hours. Furthermore, the cultivation of energy
maize comes at the expense of grassland as well as fallow and
abandoned land (cf. Lupp et al., 2014); the simulation results sup-
port this ﬁnding.
Because of the complementarity between biogas production
and cattle production in the case of attractive opportunities for
using manure as a substrate, biogas support offers indirect sub-
sidies for cattle productionwhile at the same time other production
activities are substituted. Due to the fact that land is scarce and
biogas plants as well as cattle have to be fed constantly with maize
and/or grass silage, biogas farmers have to reorient their produc-
tion to the crops that deliver more biomass per ha to avoid feed-
stock bottlenecks. Lupp et al. (2014) also mention this connection:
because maize is an attractive feedstuff for livestock and biogas, the
share of maize production increases. Furthermore, Grundmann and
Klauss (2014) conclude that “Increasing the production of energyFig. 6. Proﬁt per farm of surviving farms in 2025 in the REA 2012 and REA 2014 scenario (
biogas farms. Farms that are on the 45 line perform equally well in both scenarios. Farms un
beneﬁt in the REA 2014 scenario.from agricultural biomass tends to exert pressure on food pro-
duction, especially when the comparative advantage of food pro-
duction is low.” As our analyses do not account for biogas
investments of non-farmers, the effects are supposed to be even
stronger in reality (cf. Thünen-Atlas, 2015). On the other hand, we
have not implemented the requirement of a minimum use of heat
which probably could overestimate the investments of farmers in
biogas production.
Because the total amount of land within a region is limited,
biogas increases competition for land between farms. Thus, land
prices tend to rise. This linkage between biogas and land can affect
the whole farm structure of agricultural regions. As a consequence
of biogas support, smaller and less competitive farms quit at a
higher pace. Brendel (2011) also argues that the high re-
munerations may cause traditional farmers to lose rented land after
rental contracts expire.
However, these effects are overlapped with other more general
tendencies of structural change. Irrespective of biogas support,
structural change continues and more competitive farms pay
higher land prices while less competitive farms stagnate, shrink or
exit. Moreover, our simulations show that at least for the Altmark,
rental prices for newly rented land plots are at a very similar level
for biogas farms in the scenarios with and without biogas pro-
duction. The same applies for the non-biogas farms, though at a
substantially lower level. Accordingly, it is not only the biogas in-
vestments that drive up land prices, but rather the fact that in
general, those farms that tend to invest in biogas are in any scenario
very competitive on the land market. Rental prices are determined
by the most efﬁcient (biogas) farms. The more such potentially
investing farms exist in a region, the higher are land prices, even if
the farms would not be allowed to invest in biogas.
Because biogas support nevertheless leads to higher and
increasing land prices, not all biogas farms gain in the long-run. As
some farms may overenthusiastically invest in biogas, the
increasing land prices may hit back and may even lead to losses for
underperforming biogas farms compared to a situation without
biogas support. In the end, only those farms gain from biogas
support that are producing biogas most efﬁciently. We ﬁnd that on
average, the group of biogas farms has even a lower proﬁtabilitymodel results). Note: The scatterplot shows proﬁts per farm of single biogas and non-
derneath the 45 line beneﬁt in the REA 2012 scenario, while farms above the 45 line
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According to our results, the reform of the REA in 2014 only
partly attenuates some of the above mentioned effects. Key struc-
tural implications of the previous REA regulations can only be
reduced slowly, while others are persistent. The 2014 reform has
created both winners and losers. Even some biogas farms that
previously invested in biogas plants beneﬁt in the future from less
competition on the land market because other farms will no longer
heavily invest in further biogas plants.
To sum up, our results show that biogas policies inﬂuence in-
dividual farms as well as the development of agricultural regions.
Because different direct and indirect effects overlap, the impacts
are of a complex nature. The complementarity of biogas and live-
stock production causes an additional intensiﬁcation of land use
and more investments in livestock production. Furthermore, the
higher competition on the land market leads to increasing land
prices. Those facts add up to changes in the agricultural structure of
the analyzed regions. On average, biogas farms may not even ach-
ieve higher proﬁtability because a signiﬁcant share of the value
added is transferred via increased rental prices to the land owners.
In the end, every support for a speciﬁc type of investment has to be
seen as a tax for competing production alternatives. Moreover,
every subsidy for a speciﬁc type of farm creates disadvantages for
competing farms. These indirect effects do not only affect farms
investing in biogas, but rather the whole sector. Further reforms of
the REA should therefore better consider the implications of limited
land resources in agriculture.
Even though the last amendments of the REA in 2014 more or
less stopped investments, the previously high level of support has
long-term implications. This is mainly due to the long, useful
duration of the bioenergy plants, as well as the guaranteed feed-in
tariffs for 20 years. Therefore, the formerly high support level
granted by the pre-2014 REA rules casts a long shadow of the past.
Most of the results of the simulations can be assumed to be true
for other regions. Key drivers of the results such as differing farm
sizes within each region and different management capabilities of
farmers can be found everywhere. These heterogeneities are
responsible for speciﬁc effects such as the differing ability of farms
to invest in biogas plants and the differing proﬁtability of farming in
general, and biogas production in particular.
In principle, the heterogeneous ability of farms to invest in
biogas plants could be partly addressed by policies that ease in-
vestments for smaller and less competitive farms by providing
additional subsidies for smaller plants. It is, however, questionable
why such investments should be more beneﬁcial than support
measures for biogas in general. Smaller investments would require
guaranteed support at an even higher level per unit of bioenergy,
which in the end has to be paid by someone. Moreover, such sup-
port would also cause side effects like higher land prices, and as a
consequence unproﬁtable investments by farmers who are less
competitive.
Acknowledgments
This research was conducted within the Subproject 5 of the
German Research Foundation (DFG) research unit “Structural
change in Agriculture (SiAg)”. We gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial
support from the DFG (FOR 986/2). The authors would like to thank
two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and sug-
gestions to improve the quality of the paper.
References
AEE e Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien, 2012. The German Renewable Energy
Sources Act e a Story of Success. Available. http://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/en/policy/the-renewable-sources-act.html [3 July 2012].
Agrarheute, 2013. ‘Trog Oder Tank’ Statt ‘Teller Oder Tank’. Available. http://www.
agrarheute.com/news/trog-tank-statt-teller-tank [December 2015].
Balmann, A., 1997. Farm-based modelling of regional structural change: a cellular
automata approach, European review of agricultural economics. Found. Eur.
Rev. Agric. Econ. 24 (1), 85e108.
Balmann, A., 2015. Braucht der ostdeutsche Bodenmarkt eine st€arkere Regulierung?
Agra-Europe (13/15), pp. 49e56.
Balmann, A., Dautzenberg, K., Happe, K., Kellermann, K., 2006. On the dynamics of
structural change in agriculture: internal frictions, policy threats and vertical
integration. Outlook Agric. 35 (2), 115e121.
Balmann, A., Appel, F., Franz, R., Graubner, M., Ostermeyer, A., Sahrbacher, C., 2010.
Analyse der Wettbewerbsf€ahigkeit der Milcherzeugung und -verarbeitung in
Sachsen-Anhalt zur Ermittlung geeigneter Politikmaßnahmen und Polit-
ikoptionen im Rahmen des EPLR. gef€ordert im Rahmen der Technischen Hilfe
des Europ€aischen Landwirtschaftsfonds für die Entwicklung des l€andlichen
Raums Sachsen-Anhalt 2007e2013 (Abschlussbericht).
Bayrisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung (ed.), 2011. Datenbank
der Allgemeinen Agrarstrukturerhebung Bayern. Available. https://www.
statistikdaten.bayern.de/genesis/online [November 2011].
BMELVe Bundesministerium für Landwirtschaft, Ern€ahrung und Ver-
braucherschutz, 2012. Bioenergie-Regionen e Vorhaben zum Aufbau regionaler
Strukturen im Bereich Bioenergie. Available: http://www.bioenergie-regionen.de
[25 July 2012].
BMJ e Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2008. Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer
Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz e REA). Available. http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/REA_2009/gesamt.pdf [7 August 2012].
BMJ e Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2010. Erstes Gesetz zur €Anderung des
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes. Available: http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/start.-
xav?startbk¼Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&bk¼Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start¼//*
[@attr_id¼%27bgbl110s1170.pdf%27] [7 August 2012].
BMJe Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2011. Gesetz zur Neuregelung des
Rechtsrahmens für die F€orderung der Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren
Energien. Available. English version. http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/start.xav?
startbk¼Bundesanzeiger_BGBl. http://www.bmu.de/english/renewable_
energy/doc/47883.php [25 July 2012].
Braun, J., Lorleberg, W., Wacup, H., 2007. Vorl€auﬁger Bericht zum Projekt “Regionale
Struktur- und Einkommenswirkungen der Biogasproduktion in NRW”. Univer-
sity of Applied Sciences Südwestfalen. Available. http://www.umwelt.nrw.de/
umwelt/pdf/endbericht_biogas07.pdf [July 2012].
Brendel, F., 2011. Energie im großen Stiel e Auswirkungen des Biogas-Booms auf
Umwelt, Artenvielfalt und Landwirtschaft. Available. http://www.wwf.de/
ﬁleadmin/fm-wwf/Publikationen-PDF/Biogas_Energie_im_grossen_Stiel.pdf
[14 January 2015].
Deutschlandfunk, 2013. Renditeobjekt Ackerland e Die Auswirkungen von Bod-
enspekulationen auf die deutsche Landwirtschaft. Available. http://www.
deutschlandfunk.de/renditeobjekt-ackerland.724.de.html?dram:article_
id¼244778 [December 2015].
Fachverband Biogas, 2014. Biogas Segment Statistics 2014. Available. http://www.
biogas.org/edcom/webfvb.nsf/id/DE_Branchenzahlen/$ﬁle/14-11-25_
Biogasindustryﬁgures_2014-2015_english.pdf [14 January 2015].
Fachverband Biogas, 2015. Assessment on a Request, 13 March 2015.
Goddard, E., Weersink, A., Chen, K., Turvey, C.G., 1993. Economics of structural
change in agriculture. Can. J. Agric. Econ. 41 (4), 475e489.
Grundmann, P., Klauss, H., 2014. The impact of global trends in bioenergy pro-
duction, food supply and global warming potential e an impact assessment of
land-use changes in four regions in Germany using linear programming. J. Land
Use Sci. 9 (1), 34e58.
Grundmann, P., Kenkmann, T., Luckhaus, C., Pl€ochl, M., 2006. Wirtschaftlichkeit von
Biogasanlagen. In: Ministerium für L€andliche Entwicklung, Umwelt und Ver-
braucherschutz des Landes Brandenburg. Biogas in der Landwirtschaft e Leit-
faden für Landwirte und Investoren im Land, Brandenburg, Potsdam.
Habermann, H., Breustedt, G., 2011. Einﬂuss der Biogaserzeugung auf land-
wirtschaftliche Pachtpreise in Deutschland. Ger. J. Agric. Econ. 60 (2), 85e100.
Happe, K., 2004. Agricultural policies and farm structures - agent-based modelling
and application to EU-policy reform. Stud. Agric. Food Sect. Cent. East. Eur. 30
(IAMO).
Happe, K., Kellermann, K., Balmann, A., 2006. Agent-based analysis of agricultural
policies: an illustration of the agricultural policy simulator AgriPoliS, its adap-
tation, and behavior. Ecol. Soc. 11 (1). Available. http://www.ecologyandsociety.
org/vol11/iss1/art49 [7 August 2012].
Happe, K., Balmann, A., Kellermann, K., Sahrbacher, C., 2008. Does structure matter?
The impact of switching the agricultural policy regime on farm structures.
J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 67 (2), 431e444.
Hemmerling, U., 2013. Was folgt auf die REA-Notbremse? dbk 02/2013. Available.
http://www.bauernverband.de/altmaiers-energiewende-folgt-REA-notbremse
[04 December 2015].
Hüttel, S., Odening, M., Kataria, K., Balmann, A., 2012. Price Formation on Land
Market Auctions in East Germany e an Empirical Analysis. Mimeo.
Kellermann, K., Happe, K., Sahrbacher, C., Balmann, A., Brady, M., Schnicke, H.,
Osuch, A., 2008. AgriPoliS 2.1 e Model Documentation. Available. http://www.
agripolis.de/documentation/agripolis_v2-1.pdf [3 July 2012].
Kilian, S., Anton, J., R€oder, N., Salhofer, K., 2008. Impacts of 2003 CAP Reform on
Land Prices: from Theory to Empirical Results, 109th EAAE Seminar, Viterbo.
KLU - Kommission Landwirtschaft beim Umweltbundesamt, 2013. Biogaserzeugung
F. Appel et al. / Utilities Policy 41 (2016) 172e182182und -nutzung: €Okologische Leitplanken für die Zukunft. Available. https://
www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/ﬁles/medien/378/publikationen/
biogaserzeugung_und_-nutzung_oekologische_leitplanken_fuer_die_zukunft.
pdf [December 2015].
KTBL e Kuratorium für Technik und Bauwesen in der Landwirtschaft, 2010. Wirt-
schaftlichkeitsrechner Biogas. Available. http://daten.ktbl.de/biogas/ [April
2010].
Landtag von Sachsen-Anhalt, 2014. Antwort der Landesregierung auf eine Kleine
Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung. Drucksache 6/2889. Available. http://
dorothea-frederking.de/userspace/SA/dorothea_frederking/Dokumente/Kleine_
Anfragen/Kleine_Anfragen_mit_Antworten_der_LR/Drs._6-2889_KA_Bestand_
und_Groesse_von_Biogasanlagen.pdf.
LFL, 2006. Biogasanlagen in Bayern 2006-Ergebnisse einer Umfrage. Available.
http://www.lﬂ.bayern.de/mam/cms07/iba/dateien/biogasanlagenumfrage_
bayern_2006.pdf.
LFL, 2014. Datenbankauszug “Biogas Betreiber Datenbank Bayern” (BBD). Available.
http://www.lﬂ.bayern.de/mam/cms07/iba/dateien/bbd_biogasinzahlen_
bayern_20131231_stat.pdf.
LLFG e Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft, Forsten und Gartenbau Sachsen-Anhalt,
2009. Prozesskosten im Ackerbau in Sachsen-Anhalt e Ausgabe 2009. Available.
http://www.sachsen-anhalt.de/ﬁleadmin/Elementbibliothek/Bibliothek_
Politik_und_Verwaltung/Bibliothek_LLFG/dokumente/Betriebswirtschaft/
Infothek/ri_prozess_09.pdf [July 2009].
Lupp, G., Steinh€außer, R., Starick, A., Gies, M., Bastian, O., Albrecht, J., 2014. Forcing
Germany's renewable energy targets by increased energy crop production: a
challenge for regulation to secure sustainable land use practices. Land Use
Policy 36, 296e306.
MLUV e Ministerium für L€andliche Entwicklung, Umwelt und Verbraucherschutz
des Landes Brandenburg, 2008. Datensammlung für die Betriebsplanung und
die betriebswirtschaftliche Bewertung landwirtschaftlicher Pro-
duktionsverfahren im Land Brandenburg. Available. http://www.brandenburg.
de/sixcms/media.php/4055/bb_daten.pdf [June 2009].
Ostermeyer, A., 2015. Milchproduktion zwischen Pfadabh€angigkeit und Pfad-
brechung e Partizipative Analysen mit Hilfe des agentenbasierten ModellsAgriPoliS. Stud. Agric. Food Sect. Transit. Econ. 81. Halle (Saale).
Prognos, A.G., 2010. Investitionen durch den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien in
Deutschland. Available. http://www.bee-ev.de/_downloads/publikationen/
studien/2010/1005_Prognos-Studie_Investitionen_BEE-Ausbauprognose_lang.
pdf [3 July 2012].
REA, 2008. Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien. (Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz -REA). Available. https://www.clearingstelle-REA.de/ﬁles/REA_2009_
juris_Stand_110721.pdf [03 December 2015].
Regionale Planungsgemeinschaft Altmark, 2012. Wieder erfolgreich im Bundes-
wettbewerb: Die Altmark ist Bioenergie-Region. Available. http://altmark.eu/
bioenergie-region [13 July 2012].
Sahrbacher, C., Sahrbacher, A., Balmann, A., Ostermeyer, A., Sch€onau, F., 2012a.
Capping direct payments in the CAP: another paper tiger? EuroChoices 11 (3).
Sahrbacher, C., Sahrbacher, A., Kellermann, K., Happe, K., Balmann, A., Brady, M.,
Schnicke, H., Ostermeyer, A., Sch€onau, F., 2012b. ODD-protocol of AgriPoliS.
IAMO. Available. http://www.agripolis.de/documentation/ODD_AgriPoliS.pdf.
Spiegel, 2010. €Arger um Biogasanlage: Kalter Krieg in Ostfriesland. Available. http://
www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/aerger-um-biogasanlage-kalter-
krieg-in-ostfriesland-a-664487.html [December 2015].
StaLa e Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen-Anhalt, 2008. Agrarstrukturerhebung Teil
3: Betriebswirtschaftliche Ausrichtung, Standarddeckungsbeitr€age,
sozial€okonomische Verh€altnisse der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe. Halle/Saale.
Available. http://www.stala.sachsen-anhalt.de/download/stat_berichte/6C404_
4j_2007.pdf [5 November 2014].
StaLa e Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen-Anhalt, 2014. Ausgew€ahlte Merkmale der
landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe nach Kreisen 2013. Halle/Saale. Available. http://
www.stala.sachsen-anhalt.de/Internet/Home/Daten_und_Fakten/4/41/411/
41121/Ausgewaehlte-Merkmale-nach-Kreisen-2013-.html [12 January 2015].
taz, 2015. Der Aufstand der Biogasbauern. Available. http://www.taz.de/!5221195/
[04 December 2015].
Thünen-Atlas, 2015. Thünen-Atlas zur landwirtschaftlichen Nutzung. Johann
Heinrich von Thünen-Institut, Bundesforschungsinstitut für L€andliche R€aume,
Wald und Fischerei. Available. https://gdi.ti.bund.de/lr/agraratlas/ [4 April
2015].
